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Collaboration and the Ecology
of Democracy*
by Daniel Kemmis and Matthew McKinney**

T

Introduction

his article explores various citizen-driven, multiparty
natural resource and public land management collaborations, viewed as one emerging species within the
“ecology” of democracy. Examples from the Quincy Library
Group Partnership, Beaverhead–Deerlodge National Forest,
Blackfoot Valley, and Valles Caldera Trust will trace the trajectory of collaborative democracy from its organic inception to its
present form. To anticipate the core of the argument: we believe
that the kind of problemsolving collaboration we will be examining is democratic in the most fundamental sense of that word
because it is nothing more nor less than the effort of people to
shape the conditions under which they live, rather than leaving
that shaping to someone else.
We begin by explaining what we mean by an “emergent
form of democracy.” This concept of emergence derives primarily from complexity theory. Complexity theorists stress that it is
inherently impossible to provide in advance a rule or algorithm
that will produce the structure or pattern that in fact emerges.1
This phenomenon is illustrated both in the social and physical
realm: similar to emerging markets and cities, politics seem to
merge naturally out of the human condition. As the bureaucratic
state matured throughout the 20th century, it produced its own
characteristic set of mechanisms for “participatory democracy,”
including public notice and hearings, comment periods, and
administrative appeals.
In terms of the evolving ecology of democracy, a new
democratic life form is emerging in the open spaces left by
the older, established democratic forms of representative,
procedural, and direct democracy.2 This movement toward
a collaborative democracy is a direct response to some of the
shortcomings of the late 20th-century framework of procedural
democracy.3 Whatever else public hearings might accomplish,
they rarely result in democratic solutions.4 Surprisingly, it is the
stakeholders, who have battled each other in public hearings for
decades, who are beginning to engage in serious, face-to-face
problem solving.5 Therefore a desire for authentically-engaged
and constructive citizen involvement arose, producing new, less
structured forms of deliberative and collaborative democracy.
Multiparty collaborative natural resource and land management includes elements of alternative dispute resolution and
deliberation, but also exhibits unique features that justify its
treatment as a separate species of democracy. Specifically, the
emergence of collaboration is also a reaction to the previously
neglected importance of “place” when governing public lands.
Because so much of the collaborative experience to this point is
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place-driven, it seems worthwhile to explore what there is about
place-focused problems in land management that has produced
so much of this emergent democratic form.

The Emergence of Collaborative Land
and Natural Resources Management in the
American West
To that end, we turn our attention to the remarkable spread
of collaborative practices in our own place—the American
West—and to a range of collaborative activities arising within
this familiar setting. The West is characterized by contentious,
fairly localized natural resource issues on or near public lands
in the western states.6 Our hope is that, by examining how collaboration has emerged and matured in this rather narrow niche of
public land management, we can develop useful methodologies for
studying what catalyzes, constrains, and sustains its existence (or
for studying what might cause its failure to thrive) in other settings.
There are two especially salient components of this land
management niche. One is literally ecological: these collaborations, without exception, revolve around the uses to be made of
very specific landscapes, as well as the soil, water, flora, and
fauna of those landscapes.7 Part or all of each of these landscapes
consist of public land, usually administered either by the U.S.
Forest Service or the Bureau of Land Management.8 In most
cases, the parties to the collaboration include natural resource
extractors and users of the public land in question on the one
hand (timber or grazing interests, for example) and conservationists seeking to protect the land or the species inhabiting it
on the other.9 A fundamental feature of the dynamics behind
collaboration in these cases is the simple fact that different
people or interests have conflicting objectives for what should
happen to one particular piece of land and its natural resources.
The second key component of this setting is the existing
decision-making system that constitutes the governing framework for the public lands. This decision structure is remarkably complex, comprising a broad range of statutes such as the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”),10 the
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Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”),11 the National Forest
Management Act of 1976 (“NFMA”),12 the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”),13 and the Federal
Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (“FACA”).14 These statutes
are further fleshed out by a corresponding and even more voluminous set of agency regulations, multiple layers of appeals
(including frequent recourse to federal courts), and the case law
emerging from that litigation.15 This is the “procedural republic”
in all its glory.16
The increasing problems with this governing framework
have been extensively noted and analyzed. For example, former
Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus describes the public land
and natural resources governance system as “the tangled web of
overlapping and often contradictory laws and regulations under
which our federal public lands are managed.”17 Congressman
Scott McInnis, former Chair of the Subcommittee on Forests and
Forest Health, defines the system as “a decision-making apparatus that is on the verge of collapsing under its own weight.”18
Similarly, former Forest Service Chief Jack Ward Thomas calls
this governing framework “a sort of blob,”19 and in June 2002,
Forest Service Chief Dale Bosworth presented to Congress a
report entitled, “The Process Predicament,” which describes the
effects of regulatory and administrative gridlock on national forest management.20 The report focused heavily on the Agency’s
increasing inability to fulfill its primary duties.21 The undeniable
fact remains that the current resolution processes for addressing
natural resource conflicts on public lands simply do not work.
Collaborative democracy is emerging so profusely in this
setting because many of the people with the greatest stakes in
the landscapes in question find that the existing decision system
cannot reconcile competing stakes in these resources as effectively as can the stakeholders themselves acting on their own initiative.22 This response is especially rife in the vast reaches of the
West where public lands and natural resources are so prevalent.23
Here, in what is often referred to as the “public lands West,” we
have seen a steadily growing number of local agreements among
environmentalists, ranchers, loggers, miners, and recreationists about how the public land and natural resources should be
managed in their particular river drainage area or ecosystem.24
More and more Westerners have come to realize that they
can do better by their communities, economies, and ecosystems
by working together outside of the established, centralized
governing framework.25 Accordingly, they have largely abandoned the cumbersome, uncertain, underfunded, and increasingly irrelevant mechanisms of that older structure.26
The collaboration movement is a pragmatic response to the
slowly accumulating evidence that our historical experiment
with proceduralism produces mixed results at best. The more
statutory and regulatory layers added to any particular issue, the
denser the maze and the higher the likelihood that the system
will malfunction. Then, it is not surprising that the “public lands
West,” where more layers exist than anywhere else, is the place
where the search for an alternative decision making structure is
most active.27 It is because the existing system is so pervasively
and palpably unworkable out West that people are willing to
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put so much work into fashioning an alternative. It is this set
of circumstances, above all, that is propelling the collaborative
movement in the West.
There is simply too much at stake to let the prevailing
system continue—and inevitably fail. As such, the collaborative
method of resolving public land and natural resource issues has
spread across the region evolving from a purely organic creation
into its now-institutionalized state.28 And although some agencies now promote collaboration in a variety of ways,29 this has
not established the method’s foothold on the landscape at anyone’s direction or by anyone’s design; collaborative democracy
remains almost entirely undirected and most often occurs without any official sanction or any clear way of connecting it to the
existing decision structure.30 Thus, we will begin our tour of this
democratic evolution with the most feral examples of collaboration, and then move on to more domesticated instances.

The Quincy Library Group
The Quincy Library Group is a typical example of a
collaborative effort that arose organically and originated outside
the established governing structure. In Quincy, California, mutually dissatisfied with a management plan proposed by the Forest
Service, a group of loggers, environmentalists, citizens, and local
government officials from the area came up with an alternative
five-year management plan to preserve old growth, endangered
species habitats, and roadless areas for 2.5 million acres of forest
surrounding Quincy, and also to keep the town’s local sawmills
in business.31 Unable to persuade the Forest Service to adopt
the plan through the traditional methods, the group enlisted the
support of their congressional delegation and eventually got their
bill through Congress in 1996.32 Ultimately, the locally initiated
collaboration created a congressionally binding resolution to the
region’s valuable timber resources.33

The Beaverhead–Deerlodge Partnership
The Beaverhead–Deerlodge Partnership is another example
of the organic development of collaborative democracies. This
Partnership emerged in response to the Forest Service’s forest
plan review, which the Forest Service is obligated to conduct
at least every fifteen years.34 In keeping with that requirement,
the Forest Service published a new draft forest plan for the
Beaverhead–Deerlodge National Forest of southwestern Montana
in 2006.35 But reactions to the draft plan were mixed.36 Conservationists and timber interests had a shared history of deep
antagonism, in which they had typically taken diametrically
opposed positions at public hearings on anything proposed by the
Forest Service.37 Thus, the owners of the locally owned lumber
mills still operating in the area, already hard-pressed by global
competition, were concerned that the proposed plan would drive
them out of business because it would not allow them to harvest enough timber from the national forest to keep their mills
running.38 Conservationists, on the other hand, were convinced
that the proposed plan was short on wilderness designation and
that the proposed fish and wildlife programs were not protective
enough of threatened species.39
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One local sawmill owner, Sherman Anderson, observed that
environmental activism and Forest Service policy had reduced
the amount of public timber coming into his sawmill from ninety
percent of his feedstock to five percent.40 Those supply problems, coupled with fierce competition from Canadian mills, had
driven a steady stream of small sawmills out of business over the
last few years.41 Anderson, operating at a loss even before the
bottom dropped out of the housing market in the recession of
2008, feared that he would be next.42
After years of conventional management tactics that
resulted in this situation, representatives from five Montana
lumber mills instead began meeting independently with local
representatives from the National Wildlife Federation, the
Montana Wilderness Association, and the Montana Trout
Unlimited to explore whether they might collectively find more
beneficial outcomes for forest management than those proposed
by the Forest Service.43 This collaborative effort became known
as the Beaverhead–Deerlodge Partnership.44 The partners found
common ground after some of the conservationists acknowledged that logging itself was not necessarily bad for wildlife
and water quality if it was conducted in the right way and at
the right scale.45 The timber interests, meanwhile, acknowledged
the conservationists’ view that substantial portions of the forest
should not be logged, but would be better protected as wilderness.46 The two sides hammered out ways to fit fish and wildlife
restoration into a sustainable timber-harvesting program.47 The
Partnership’s laborious efforts were eventually incorporated into
legislation introduced by Senator Jon Tester, which is currently
pending in Congress.48

The Blackfoot Challenge
As this kind of citizen-initiated collaboration has gained
momentum in the public land and resources arena, government
agencies have sometimes been invited to become collaborating
partners. Consider, for example, the Blackfoot Challenge. This
collaborative group that includes private landowners, federal and
state land managers, local government officials, and corporate
landowners now coordinates much of the management of the
Blackfoot River, its tributaries, and adjacent public and private
lands—approximately 2,400 square miles in western Montana.49
Working together, the mission of the Blackfoot Challenge is
“to coordinate efforts that conserve and enhance the natural
resources and rural way of life throughout the watershed.”50 The
Blackfoot Challenge is now known nationally as a collaborative
model for preserving the wild beauty, ecological health, and
natural resources of the watershed.51
When the Obama administration launched its America’s
Great Outdoors initiative in 2010, it staged its first public event
on the ranch owned by Jim Stone, the chair of the Blackfoot
Challenge board, as a way of underscoring how important the
collaborative efforts of groups like this have become in the
recent history of American conservation.52 In a recent interview,
Denny Iverson, the Challenge Board’s Treasurer, explained
that he moved with his parents from Minnesota to a Blackfoot
Valley ranch in 1975.53 He was in high school at the time, and
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he tells how his father, whose dream had long been to own a
ranch in Montana, initially struggled to make this dream ranch
profitable.54 Many ranchers were already employing creative
ways to preserve their properties. For example, like many of
their neighbors, one way the Iverson’s had kept their ranch in
the black was by leasing some of the surrounding public land
for their cattle to graze on.55 As with hundreds of other ranchers
across the West, the profitability of their ranch depended on the
grazing resources of those leases.56 But once public land grazing
had become a target of several national environmental groups,
these groups threatened the ranchers that their leases would not
be renewed unless grazing could be done in an environmentally
benign way.57
Another way the Iversons kept their ranch solvent was by
spending a fair amount of time in the local woods, supplying
timber to local sawmills.58 Some of that timber came from private
land, like their ranch, but some also came from Forest Service
land.59 As with public land grazing, some national environmental
groups sought to end all commercial harvesting of timber from
public land.60 If successful, those efforts would have reduced
the thin margin that supported the Iverson ranch and family.
Ultimately, the family survived by collaborating with neighbors
and local interests in the Blackfoot Challenge. Whether it was
grazing or logging, the Iversons and their neighbors (including
the neighboring sawmills) learned that they had to become
conservationists to preserve their way of life. It is primarily the
Blackfoot Challenge that enabled them to do that. Above all, i
t has given them a new way of working with conservation
organizations like the Nature Conservancy or Trout Unlimited,
and with government agencies like the Forest Service.
Both federal and state land management agencies are seated
on the Board of Blackfoot Challenge, and Iverson spends a lot
of time working with them.61 When asked whether his involvement with this collaborative group has changed his view of
government, Iverson responded, “It’s changed it in a big way.
Before, I was just trying to scratch a living out of the ground.
I was a pretty right-wing conservative, with very little use for
government, especially the federal government.”62 Although he
has not changed his core principles, he now recognizes that both
he and the government agencies have changed since their initial
consultations; Iverson considers himself to be more moderate
than before, 63 and says that the agencies are “more efficient
[and] more responsive.”64 Iverson attributes his involvement with
the Blackfoot Challenge with enabling him to see the agency
personnel as people who share similar community values.65
According to Iverson, “When the meeting’s over, we’ll buy them
a beer. In fact, we’d never have gotten to know each other so well
if we hadn’t started going to Trixie’s Antler Saloon together.”66
Iverson and the Blackfoot Challenge have show “how government works—or maybe more important, how it can work.”67
Here again, as with the Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership,
a diverse group of citizens has taken the initiative to conserve a
place that is near and dear to their hearts. As a result, the Blackfoot Challenge’s mission statement, “to coordinate efforts that
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conserve and enhance the natural resources and rural way of life
throughout the watershed,” has finally become a reality.68

The Valles Caldera Trust
At present, one of the strongest tributes to the effectiveness of collaboration in the public land and resource arena
is the fact that the practice itself has become more often
blessed, if not mandated, by both statutes and agency rules and
procedures.69 One good statutory example is the Valles Caldera
Trust.70 In 2000, Congress acquired the privately-owned Baca
Ranch in northern New Mexico.71 Instead of giving one of the
existing land management agencies responsibility for this newly
acquired public land, Congress mandated that “an experimental
management regime should be provided by the establishment of
a trust capable of using new methods of public land management that may prove cost-effective and environmentally sensitive.”72 Specifically, Congress established a diverse, multiparty
governing board for the land and its natural resources and, in
effect, mandated that it be managed collaboratively.73 Given the
initial success of the Valles Caldera Trust, Congress again called
collaboration into play three years later in the Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003.74 This shows that Congress has
confidence in the various stakeholders’ ability to “reduce wildfire
risk to communities, municipal water supplies, and other at-risk
Federal land through a collaborative process of planning, prioritizing, and implementing hazardous fuel reduction projects.”75

Moving Towards Government-initiated
Collaborative Land and Natural
Resource Management
Following this trend toward governmental involvement,
public land management agencies themselves now routinely
invite or encourage collaboration among various stakeholders.
To illustrate this type of collaboration, consider the ongoing
process to develop a new planning rule for the Forest Service.
The National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), which governs
land and resource management in the national forests, requires
the Agency to develop plans for all national forests and grasslands.76 The Forest Service adopted the first set of rules to guide
the development of these plans in 1979.77 Although the planning
rules were revised in 1982, all four subsequent attempts to revise
the rules have each failed.78
In 2009, at the direction of the Obama administration,
the Forest Service launched yet another effort to revise and
update the planning rules.79 Collaboration has emerged as a
hallmark of this new process. According to the official Forest
Service website, the agency “is committed to developing a new
planning rule that endures over time. We believe a transparent
and participatory method is the best way to accomplish this.
We’ll be working hard to gather input collaboratively throughout
the development of a new planning rule.”80
This rulemaking approach is an example of how government agencies now frequently use collaboration. In this case,
it is being used to develop administrative rules, but agencies
also increasingly use collaboration to develop policy proposals,
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management plans, and site-specific work plans.81 The government’s use of collaboration is not limited to natural resources
and environmental policy, and is increasingly invoked at every
level—local, state, and federal—to formulate (via the legislative
branch) and implement (via the executive branch) public policy.82
However, the transition of place-specific collaborative
results into legislation remains problematic. One observer has
noted, for example, “if replicated more broadly, the place-based
approach to forest management could further disaggregate the
National Forest system.”83 This concern was also echoed by
Undersecretary of Agriculture Harris Sherman when he testified on Senator Tester’s pending bill, noting that place-specific
collaboration “establishes a potentially harmful precedent
because it may lead to multiple site-specific legislative efforts
transferring much needed resources from other units of the
National Forest System where priority work must also be
accomplished.”84 Here again, the difficulty may be viewed as
a manifestation of the old problem of the few and the many.
The perspective of a more broadly representative, but genuinely
deliberative, public could be brought to bear on some of these
conflicts, which could expand the range of public involvement without necessarily losing the problem solving impetus
that has led to the collaborative solution in the first place.
Integration of the enactment into legislation of place-based collaborative management into legislation, then, is both promising
and problematic.
The one thing that contributes most significantly to the
steady expansion of collaborative problem solving is the fact
that, in so many circumstances, it works. And in fact, it works
better than other available democratic mechanisms.85 In evolutionary terms, this is a straightforward example of natural
selection: what works well survives and thrives.86 Collaboration
has gained a foothold in certain niches of our political ecology
because it brings a kind of selective advantage to those settings.

Conclusion
Although these government-sponsored efforts are a welcome addition to the ecology of democracy, they represent
a qualitatively different kind of collaboration than the type of
citizeninitiated collaboration illustrated by the Beaverhead–
Deerlodge Partnership or the Blackfoot Challenge. Our experience has convinced us that, at least in the public lands arena,
collaboration would never have been widely employed by agencies, let alone mandated by legislative bodies, had it not initially
emerged in a completely organic, indirect way, and if it had not
proven its viability on the challenging political landscape that
produced it. It is this organic, citizen-initiated form of collaboration that we mean when we speak of “collaborative democracy.”
Encouraging as the government adoption of collaborative
methods may be, it also raises questions about how readily collaboration can be transposed into settings that vary substantially
from those in which it emerged. To extend the ecological metaphor a step further, creating collaborative approaches to public
land and resource issues by the use of legislation or administrative practice can be viewed as the equivalent of domesticating
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animals or plants that originally emerged and evolved in the
wild. Useful and often lovable as these domesticated species
may be, it nevertheless remains true that a dog is not a wolf,
nor is a cat a tiger. Thus, while we promote and encourage
collaboration in a number of constrained institutional settings,
the need to preserve space and if possible, native habitat, means
that collaborative democracy must continue to flourish and
evolve in its own organic, undirected way.87
Recall, for example, the Blackfoot Challenge, the landowner-based group in Montana that helps to coordinate the
management of the Blackfoot River, its tributaries, and adjacent
public and private lands.88 The Challenge was organized locally,
but known nationally as a model for preserving the rural character,
ecological health, and natural beauty of its watershed.89 It supports environmentally responsible resource stewardship through
cooperation of private and public interests.90 These interested parties all share a common vision of how the Challenge operates in
the Blackfoot watershed, and all believe that success is most likely
to result from building trust by working together.
The Blackfoot Challenge, however, is merely part of a
grander scheme. It is a good example of how place-based collaborative efforts often “nest” within one another as the watershed
lies within the much larger Crown of the Continent.91 During the
past eight years, a number of independent and complementary
initiatives (including the Blackfoot Challenge) have emerged to
promote conservation and community stewardship in this remarkable landscape.92 These initiatives present the prospect of grander
collaboration between individual collaborative coalitions.

The enticing possibility is that this nesting of networked,
collaborative initiatives will evolve into new forms of governance. This is best described by Meg Wheatley and Deborah
Frieze in “Using Emergence to Take Social Innovations to
Scale,” as a common phase in the process of emergence characterized by “the sudden appearance of a system that has real
power and influence.”93 Further, Wheatley and Frieze explain
how “[p]ioneering efforts that hovered at the periphery suddenly
become the norm.”94
This emerging system has profound implications for
regional entrepreneurs. By better understanding the emergent
properties of nested, place-based collaborative efforts in a locale
like the Crown of the Continent, individuals and organizations
will be better poised to mobilize political power and facilitate
lasting change. Coincidentally, they can also develop and test
new forms of governance, thinking regionally and acting at
whatever spatial scale makes sense.
These, then, are some of the governance implications that
seem to be manifesting in conjunction with the ongoing emergence of collaboration (especially place-based collaboration) as
a democratic form. While it may be impossible to predict with
any precision what exact forms of democratic governance might
actually emerge, it seems clear that the better we understand
the dynamics driving these exciting and promising developments, the better positioned we will be to encourage those most
likely to advance both the cause of democracy and protection of
America’s natural resources.
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